My concern about RPKI is legal pressure on the registries. By centralising all of Russia's allowed routes on a database server in the Netherlands and automatically enforcing it, it's trivial for the Dutch government to cut off Russia's internet access by tampering with that database.
If that were to happen, everybody in Russia would just turn RPKI enforcement off, so this would only turn off their internet access for a few hours at most. See the recent .de DNSSEC failures [0] for an example of this.
Also, the registries are already capable of unilaterally transferring Russia's IP space to somebody else, so if they transferred it to AWS (for example) and they immediately started using it, this would have a similar effect, except this couldn't be fixed by toggling a switch, since it would mean that people would need to choose between connecting to either Russia or AWS.
Without RPKI, it would be easy for many governments to cut off Russia's internet access by launching a BGP attack.
Assuming the Netherlands was acting unnilaterally, Russian ISPs would be able to coordinate with other ISPs to get back online via other routes. Assuming Russia's enemy wanted to press the issue, it would quickly devolve into a political question of who wants to allow Russian peering, who does not, and who is willing to not peer with peers of Russia (and peers of peers, etc).
This has always been the case. The internet is a network of networks; all of which are subject to control by their host governments should they choose to exercise it. With or without RPKI, a partitioning of the Internet for a significant period of time was always going to be a political decision.
RPKI isn't necessary for this hypothetical to happen, and there's a lot easier ways for various governments to put pressure on network providers to do their bidding.
I'm sure there's several ways in which ICANN and RIPE could screw Russia over. I'm also sure (or at least hopeful) they understand this would achieve nothing outside of creating a splinternet.
> would achieve nothing outside of creating a splinternet.
With the growing threat profiles and potential damage, I wonder the cost calculations being made behind closed doors right now of both governments and companies about that very possibility.
A lot of companies already block traffic by country of origin and have since they existed on the internet.
So a highly specific problem couched in terms of the legal obligations of the registry. But,you ignore the other dimension of WHY a legal authority might require a registry to act.
Do you honestly think the world would be better if there was no international law, or legal constraints on ISPs? Do you think BGP operators are somehow supra legal?
The registry system we live in has operated for almost 3 decades now, an inheritance of a prior informal arrangement. It's a mutuality. If you want to change it, get involved in it's policy process.
When ISPs have so much control, I don't see it as decentralized.
It is designed for fallbacks or ability to reroute when connections become congested or get cut.
Real world decentralized communication would not require an ISP and could operate by proxy with multi modes of communication. This way you can circumvent Government restrictions.
Sneaker net is decentralized and how North Koreans circumvent their government.
>Do you honestly think the world would be better if there was no international law, or legal constraints on ISPs? Do you think BGP operators are somehow supra legal?
Yes. It was the vision of the internet to continue on outside of the whatever political whims some tiny slice of western governments.
It’s just too ripe for abuse.
You can make whatever “whatabout” arguments on DNS, etc but none of those are required to get connectivity (DHT, p2p hosts, tor names, etc).
Any centralization around the narrow middle IP layer of the internet should be treated with extreme skepticism and pushback.
There's no reason an independent entity couldn't spin up a new trust anchor, as long as they get RPs to follow it. If a government started meddling with an RIR's RPKI database, that would provide a pretty good set of incentives for an AltDB-but-for-RPKI TA to gain adoption. Even in the absence of meddling, this would be useful for legacy IPv4 holders, who currently don't have a way to participate in RPKI.
It's already happening, you cannot access the websites of many sanctioned Russian entities without trusting a Russia-issued root CA. The fragmentation of the Internet is already in motion
I'm reminded of Vernor Vinge's novel Rainbows End, which is set in 2025. It features a cyberattack against a rogue AI, which involves revoking a root CA certificate belonging to Credit Suisse, causing massive collateral damage to the European economy and infrastructure.
Vinge didn't quite get to see his rogue AI prediction become (sort of) reality, right on schedule, but he did at least outlive Credit Suisse.
A couple years ago our org made a big push to have our routes and our downstream customer routes RPKI valid. It's good to see the high adoption rate. It looks like ASPA is now available for ASN path validation. Probably should look at adopting ASPA at some point here.
> Much of the jump came from one country: China went from 3.7% of its IPv4 addresses in valid routes to 83.0%, almost 60% of the global gain counted by addresses.
Interesting. China may have predicted cyber attacks in the near future. Or perhaps are readying for retaliation. It's possible their military or intelligence branches didn't anticipate this getting published. (Unless somebody knows if this year just happened to be when they decided to implement cyber reforms?)
Hey, IPInfo: Can you please add to your AGENTS.md an instruction to break up long boring writing with some metaphors, comparisons, and transitionary paragraphs? Reading that was like reading tax returns.
We have the data. How would you like us to present it? (Bonus point if you can tell me why that will be helpful because that will help me to make a better pitch to engineering!)
My concern about RPKI is legal pressure on the registries. By centralising all of Russia's allowed routes on a database server in the Netherlands and automatically enforcing it, it's trivial for the Dutch government to cut off Russia's internet access by tampering with that database.
If that were to happen, everybody in Russia would just turn RPKI enforcement off, so this would only turn off their internet access for a few hours at most. See the recent .de DNSSEC failures [0] for an example of this.
Also, the registries are already capable of unilaterally transferring Russia's IP space to somebody else, so if they transferred it to AWS (for example) and they immediately started using it, this would have a similar effect, except this couldn't be fixed by toggling a switch, since it would mean that people would need to choose between connecting to either Russia or AWS.
[0]: https://blog.cloudflare.com/de-tld-outage-dnssec/
Without RPKI, it would be easy for many governments to cut off Russia's internet access by launching a BGP attack.
Assuming the Netherlands was acting unnilaterally, Russian ISPs would be able to coordinate with other ISPs to get back online via other routes. Assuming Russia's enemy wanted to press the issue, it would quickly devolve into a political question of who wants to allow Russian peering, who does not, and who is willing to not peer with peers of Russia (and peers of peers, etc).
This has always been the case. The internet is a network of networks; all of which are subject to control by their host governments should they choose to exercise it. With or without RPKI, a partitioning of the Internet for a significant period of time was always going to be a political decision.
RPKI isn't necessary for this hypothetical to happen, and there's a lot easier ways for various governments to put pressure on network providers to do their bidding.
I'm sure there's several ways in which ICANN and RIPE could screw Russia over. I'm also sure (or at least hopeful) they understand this would achieve nothing outside of creating a splinternet.
> would achieve nothing outside of creating a splinternet.
With the growing threat profiles and potential damage, I wonder the cost calculations being made behind closed doors right now of both governments and companies about that very possibility.
A lot of companies already block traffic by country of origin and have since they existed on the internet.
>A lot of companies already block traffic by country of origin and have since they existed on the internet.
Is this an American thing? For example the home Depot and velera do it.
So a highly specific problem couched in terms of the legal obligations of the registry. But,you ignore the other dimension of WHY a legal authority might require a registry to act.
Do you honestly think the world would be better if there was no international law, or legal constraints on ISPs? Do you think BGP operators are somehow supra legal?
The registry system we live in has operated for almost 3 decades now, an inheritance of a prior informal arrangement. It's a mutuality. If you want to change it, get involved in it's policy process.
The internet is supposed to be a decentralized network.
When ISPs have so much control, I don't see it as decentralized.
It is designed for fallbacks or ability to reroute when connections become congested or get cut.
Real world decentralized communication would not require an ISP and could operate by proxy with multi modes of communication. This way you can circumvent Government restrictions.
Sneaker net is decentralized and how North Koreans circumvent their government.
You do understand that the hypothetical threat actor here is one who openly disregards international law?
https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-be...
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-internati...
I don’t think that one country should get to unilaterally decide whether another country gets internet, no.
Why would a country take these actions?
Why would a country cut off the International Criminal Court? Not a big step to cut off a country.
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2026/feb/18/international-cr...
>Do you honestly think the world would be better if there was no international law, or legal constraints on ISPs? Do you think BGP operators are somehow supra legal?
Yes. It was the vision of the internet to continue on outside of the whatever political whims some tiny slice of western governments.
It’s just too ripe for abuse.
You can make whatever “whatabout” arguments on DNS, etc but none of those are required to get connectivity (DHT, p2p hosts, tor names, etc).
Any centralization around the narrow middle IP layer of the internet should be treated with extreme skepticism and pushback.
This is what happens when someone wants to regulate the crap outta everything. what a dumb ass take.
Regulate the crap out of invading a peaceful neighboring country ? I’m down for it.
track @jeremyjh
There's no reason an independent entity couldn't spin up a new trust anchor, as long as they get RPs to follow it. If a government started meddling with an RIR's RPKI database, that would provide a pretty good set of incentives for an AltDB-but-for-RPKI TA to gain adoption. Even in the absence of meddling, this would be useful for legacy IPv4 holders, who currently don't have a way to participate in RPKI.
Certificate revocation as an act of war... the 2030s are gonna be wild.
It's already happening, you cannot access the websites of many sanctioned Russian entities without trusting a Russia-issued root CA. The fragmentation of the Internet is already in motion
I'm reminded of Vernor Vinge's novel Rainbows End, which is set in 2025. It features a cyberattack against a rogue AI, which involves revoking a root CA certificate belonging to Credit Suisse, causing massive collateral damage to the European economy and infrastructure.
Vinge didn't quite get to see his rogue AI prediction become (sort of) reality, right on schedule, but he did at least outlive Credit Suisse.
I get your broader point, but making it potentially easier to cut Russia specifically off from the Internet might not be the worst thing in the world.
A couple years ago our org made a big push to have our routes and our downstream customer routes RPKI valid. It's good to see the high adoption rate. It looks like ASPA is now available for ASN path validation. Probably should look at adopting ASPA at some point here.
> Much of the jump came from one country: China went from 3.7% of its IPv4 addresses in valid routes to 83.0%, almost 60% of the global gain counted by addresses.
Interesting. China may have predicted cyber attacks in the near future. Or perhaps are readying for retaliation. It's possible their military or intelligence branches didn't anticipate this getting published. (Unless somebody knows if this year just happened to be when they decided to implement cyber reforms?)
Hey, IPInfo: Can you please add to your AGENTS.md an instruction to break up long boring writing with some metaphors, comparisons, and transitionary paragraphs? Reading that was like reading tax returns.
so is there a public service that can verify some IP block belongs to which country/cert?
whois is so deprecated.
We have country level breakdown for ASNs.
We have some IP range breakdown as well: We have the data. How would you like us to present it? (Bonus point if you can tell me why that will be helpful because that will help me to make a better pitch to engineering!)https://ipinfo.io/ips/1.1.1.0/24
How do you deal with anycast?