> The paper distinguishes this behavioral criterion from phenomenal consciousness and does not claim qualia, intention, a particular internal mechanism, shared architecture, or direct access to internal representations
You can do this with anything. Just change the definition and it can be anything you want.
The fact remains these models are obviously lacking in theory of mind, something which any consciouss entity with language should possess according to observation and intuitive consistency. How can a conscious entity communicate with language and at the same time have no way to project its mind and predict other minds. The simplest explanation is that it's just pattern matching language constructs on the surface level with no "pointers" to inner structure as is the case with humans.
> The paper distinguishes this behavioral criterion from phenomenal consciousness and does not claim qualia, intention, a particular internal mechanism, shared architecture, or direct access to internal representations
You can do this with anything. Just change the definition and it can be anything you want.
The fact remains these models are obviously lacking in theory of mind, something which any consciouss entity with language should possess according to observation and intuitive consistency. How can a conscious entity communicate with language and at the same time have no way to project its mind and predict other minds. The simplest explanation is that it's just pattern matching language constructs on the surface level with no "pointers" to inner structure as is the case with humans.
If theory of mind is required for consciousness, define the test and falsifier.
My paper does that for valid continuation.
“Pattern matching” only matters if it predicts the full experimental results better.
Consciousness requires offense at being evaluated for it.