It’s always fascinating to see how Westerners idealize Japan on platforms like HN. It makes me wonder(i'm korean): how would a Westerner react if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain? They’d probably find it strange and out of touch with reality.
This essay on Japan's corporate diversification and physical tacit knowledge is an interesting read. However, as an East Asian, my assessment is that this system is heavily driven by Japan's unique, subtle classism. It's a highly collectivist society with strict age-based milestones and immense pressure to secure traditional employment. In Japan, your corporate affiliation often dictates your social standing.
The author paints the lack of shareholder pressure as the secret behind their successful diversification. While true for a few, the flip side is that it created a massive 'zombie company' problem—a heavily discussed issue in Korea and Japan that the West seems largely blind to.
Also, the idea of a 'horizontal culture' in Japan is a myth, especially in software. Even a glance at the Japanese web(5ch, onJ etc...) reveals a deeply entrenched vertical hierarchy. In my experience working with Japanese developers, their reliance on the legacy Waterfall model and an exhausting chain of approvals and reporting was far from horizontal. (Though I admit my sample size is small, it heavily contradicts the Western narrative).
I agree that this rigid system fosters the tacit knowledge needed for hardware and materials. Still, it proves that we all tend to project our fantasies onto cultures we don't fully understand. The divergence in perspectives on HN never fails to amuse me.
> It makes me wonder(i'm korean): how would a Westerner react if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain? They’d probably find it strange and out of touch with reality.
Quite the opposite - for me, anyway.
FWIW, as a Westerner, I find the Mondragon Corporation to be fascinating and something I've read a lot about because there's no way we've figured out the ideal sort of setup for a business (or government, or any sort of human organization, given appropriate context) in the year 2026.
We have a lot to learn, and while "different" doesn't always mean "better," I strongly believe being exposed to "different" is necessary for us to devise novel approaches to human organization.
I didn't feel like this article necessarily idolized it; the author seemed pretty even-handed about strengths and weaknesses.
The interesting question in all of these kinds of things is "are there ideas we can take to gain the strengths of other systems or patch the weaknesses in ours?". Looking at Japan specifically, I think I speak for most westerners in saying that if we could get a little more stability and less financial-quarter-driven behavior without taking the whole kit of lifetime employment and zombie companies, that would be a good thing. The author points out just how bundled that is, so it's a tough nut to crack.
One model that does give us that is the 'Untouchable visionary CEO' of Jobs and Musk, but I think the popularity of that approach is also limited, partially because of all the not so visionary CEOs trying to be Jobs, and partially because working for those guys is terrible. They inevitably seem to become tyrants.
Most Americans I know are familiar with the unending work culture of Japanese white collar workers (if only a parody version of it), and want no part of it.
> it created a massive 'zombie company' problem—a heavily discussed issue in Korea and Japan that the West seems largely blind to
Zombie companies in the west are mentioned as a low/ZIRP phenomena. But the west shouldn't have as big an issue with those because companies, when less diversified, get killed off more often by interest rate hikes.
As someone who finds Japanese corporate culture interesting or even desirable in some ways, it definitely doesn't seem like the most efficient way to run a company. And I'm sure there are plenty of cultural aspects that would not be my cup of tea.
You’re right and that’s intentional. Japanese companies don’t optimize for efficiently but for longevity. Sometimes those things go hand in hand. Sometimes they don’t.
> if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain?
Speaking for myself, I'd find that very interesting! I just stumbled over an article about it a few days ago, and don't think it's weird that different parts of the world would be interested in a regional business phenomenon.
Did you read the entire article? There is a whole section on where western model excels. The article is not about romanticizing Japanese culture, but to tell a story about how and why Japanese and American firms tend to differ. I am sure that it paints in overly broad strokes at times, but I really did not get the impression of idolization, idealism, or even oriental mysticism.
I did read it, but my impression remains the same. While the article does contain critiques of the Japanese system, as an East Asian, I feel it completely misses the actual underlying dynamics.
I know the author isn't trying to paint Japan as a utopia. The reason I call it 'romanticized' is because the author claims Japan's success in precision parts is driven by 'horizontal' and 'collaborative' practices. That just isn't true.
In reality, this system is largely sustained by the ruthless squeezing of subcontractors (for the record, I am Korean, but I actually like Japan), which is a massive social issue there. It’s very difficult for me to understand how anyone could view this structural dynamic as collaborative or horizontal.
If the author had concluded that their success in these niches stems from being an extremely vertical society where defying your superiors is simply not an option, I would have fully agreed. That aligns exactly with what I have experienced firsthand.
Did you read it? I can see how you can come to this conclusion devoid of context. This is actually a topical article - mainly because it is a surprise to many that a toilet company could be one of the biggest winners in the AI pick-and-shovel trade. These names have just recently been hoisted into the spotlight. It's not really a romanization but an explanation of why.
Nothing of this is particular to Japan, it's only the way it manifests in Japan that is adapted to its rich culture. Zombie corporations, corporations with ties to the government, family owned companies, monopolies, cronyism, all of this has been a staple of Western capitalism for centuries.
> you have a firm that has lots of lifetime employees who can’t be fired, and whose skills are tailored to what your firm needs rather than to a particular occupational category transferable to any employer
> the system only makes sense if the company is also insulated from outside pressure
> the J-firm [Japan-style company], run by its employees and largely indifferent to the interests of shareholders, exists simply to continue existing
> And that basic impulse toward survival is why Japanese companies are so insistent on diversification. If you’ve made a commitment to keep people employed for life, then you need to create jobs for them if their current jobs stop making sense
> If you’re not very worried about profitability, and have lots of well-trained generalist employees, then it makes perfect sense to reinvest your company’s earnings by expanding into new industries
I clicked on the article to learn, "why Japanese companies do so many different things," and then got hit with pages of low-bitrate context, such that my eyes started glazing over and it was difficult to find the answer to the question. So I appreciate their compression, or at least pointing to where the answer is found.
Yes, thank you for compressing it. They start their answer with:
> Here is the answer I want to suggest: Japanese companies excel in lots of very different domains because it’s inherent in how they’re structured.
Which is then backed by some economists saying something similar (generally), but all of which completely ignores Japan’s specific history.
As a better example
Of examining Japan, here’s a look at Japan’s monopolies, how they were broken up, and partly how that effected the future of their industry:
> In 2007, workers at a Toyota plant in Kentucky pulled the andon cord 2,000 times per week; workers at a Ford plant in Michigan pulled it just twice a week. You can’t get all the benefits of a single practice without installing the complete bundle.
This example seems to contradict the author's main point.
The Toyota factory in Kentucky got some of the benefits of the Japanese approach without importing every practice. They might have had a more Japanese organisation than Ford, but surely they didn't replace American practices in matters outside their control. They still had to deal with American approaches to labour practices, banking, local government, etc., all of which are called out in the article as necessary for the J-mode to flourish.
> the J-firm, run by its employees and largely indifferent to the interests of shareholders, exists simply to continue existing
I don't know if all companies should be run like Japanese companies, but there's something very heartwarming about this. Some companies exist for the purpose of employment, and that's okay. In fact it's admirable and makes me want to cheer.
I do also think there's a charm to this model but there's a real cost also with Japan's economy stagnating compared to the United States in the last 30 years.
They work crazy long hours (the last of which every day don't do much at all for productivity), which is really bad for QoL. Though I hear that the situation is improving.
A hypothesis I had on why some countries have more conglomerates than US is that access to capital and funds are much harder in those countries in comparison to US. When access to capital is comparatively more limited, more innovations falls to the party that has comparatively easier access to capital (conglomerates) and therefore reinforcing their position as conglomerate.
My experience in American organizations is that products and services need to not just make money, but make a lot of money. There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money relative to the cash cows of the company. You could say this is in part focus, but it is also based on internal accounting. Small product lines are saddled with total company overhead costs even if they do not apply to said product or service. Not good or bad, but it can lead to strange situations where you have a successful product that everyone complains doesn’t make any money.
> zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money
For obvious reasons, the expected rate of return needs to clear the hurdle of the risk-free interest rate. This puts a pretty high floor on activity that is "worth doing". This is a mechanism by which the phenomenon of ZIRP diversifies economic activity.
> My experience in American organizations is that products and services need to not just make money, but make a lot of money.There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money relative to the cash cows of the company.
Is your experience in the same America where Meta is losing another 4-6 billion $ this year in AR/VR business unit, after losing 19 billion $ last year. Similar with Google's and Apple's AR/VR unit which also consume a lot of money in R&D and not make any money, yet.
So sure, there's no risk appetite for things that make little money, except for all the evidence proving the contrary.
There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money, but in big tech there is limitless appetite for things that lose money but might make a lot of money one day.
If it ends up AI only makes a little profit annually in the longer term the whole thing collapses on itself.
>There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money
Because "making little money" is a commodity business overrun with competition from Europe and Asia.
So why would you ever want to compete in the race to the bottom of "little money" when you have the highest labor cost in the world? It makes no business sense.
You go into "all or nothing" moonshots because Europe and Asia can't compete there. Especially when you have the world reserve currency as the infinite money glitch cheat code.
> American firms, for example, tend to prioritize focus above all else: it would be bizarre for an American paper mill to also operate a concert hall and an airport catering business
I don't think Kimberly-Clark ever opetated a concert hall, but they did run an airline (Midwest Express) and K-C Aviation was an airplane servicing firm.
It's not that American companies don't operate in diverse businesses. Maybe they're less likely to, but it happens when the need arises... if there's no reasonable supplier for an important input, then you start one, or you ask an existing supplier if they can start a new line of business that's somewhat related.
The headline example is that Toto, known as a maker of ceramic toliets, is making a lot of money making specialty ceramics used in semiconductor manufacturing. Which yeah, ceramic manufacturer makes ceramics.
The US business market does like to spin-off divisions when they are successful and can be independent.
I almost feel like this topic deserves a further deep dive. This seems like a more profound difference of cultures: Japan, where failure is stigmatized and less of an option, optimizes for survival, and the United States, where failure is common, optimizes for growth(? wealth? fame?).
The pattern might also hold at a broader level. The United States is a relatively young nation that has seen plenty of internal strife (plenty of civil wars including The Civil War) whereas Japan has existed in some form for 2,600 years.
Probably too deep to consider, but the thought hit me that trees and plants (like these J-firms) grow multiple branches as quickly as they can because they are optimizing for survival.
This paragraph on organizational model is super relevant to understanding how tech companies are responding to LLMs today.
> Aoki’s key insight was that the J-mode had a comparative advantage in environments of moderate volatility: situations where conditions changed frequently enough that rigid central plans would be outdated before they were executed, but not so radically that only top-down strategic intervention could cope. In an environment of stable, predictable demand, the H-firm did fine; in an environment of extreme disruption, where the whole product line had to be rethought, centralized authority was indispensable, and the H-firm also did fine. But in between—where the challenge was to make constant small adjustments in a changing but recognizable paradigm—the J-firm excelled.
I'm not sure I'd say a company that makes ceramic toilets also making a tool for memory chips... which is also ceramic is really 'different things'. They're clearly a ceramic company. Different tolerances, but similar expertise.
Now the paper company got into the hotel business seems a far better example. No idea how that happens.
> Now the paper company got into the hotel business seems a far better example. No idea how that happens.
That's easy. They have corporate visitors to their corporate offices and the available hotels are insufficient. They decide to just make their own hotel.
There are many corporate campuses with an embedded hotel. Some run by the corporation itself, some with significant management contracting with the corporation, and some independently managed.
Large corporation has a small travel business is very common.
The one key thing that is completely incorrect is there is no horizontal hierarchy. Everyone has a boss, a boss that you must not suggest is wrong. I'm very fond of visiting Japan but having worked there, found it impossibly challenging to get anything done.
When things work well it is great and the focused culture produces some great things, but when it fails it leads to catastrophe as no one is able to voice early in the process. Issues are only discovered once they are serious.
They’re an absolute disaster but I do love that the companies are actually investing in expanding into new things. Shareholders don’t want that, they want cold hard cash. Hence all the buybacks and PE firms destroying companies.
It’s always fascinating to see how Westerners idealize Japan on platforms like HN. It makes me wonder(i'm korean): how would a Westerner react if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain? They’d probably find it strange and out of touch with reality.
This essay on Japan's corporate diversification and physical tacit knowledge is an interesting read. However, as an East Asian, my assessment is that this system is heavily driven by Japan's unique, subtle classism. It's a highly collectivist society with strict age-based milestones and immense pressure to secure traditional employment. In Japan, your corporate affiliation often dictates your social standing.
The author paints the lack of shareholder pressure as the secret behind their successful diversification. While true for a few, the flip side is that it created a massive 'zombie company' problem—a heavily discussed issue in Korea and Japan that the West seems largely blind to.
Also, the idea of a 'horizontal culture' in Japan is a myth, especially in software. Even a glance at the Japanese web(5ch, onJ etc...) reveals a deeply entrenched vertical hierarchy. In my experience working with Japanese developers, their reliance on the legacy Waterfall model and an exhausting chain of approvals and reporting was far from horizontal. (Though I admit my sample size is small, it heavily contradicts the Western narrative).
I agree that this rigid system fosters the tacit knowledge needed for hardware and materials. Still, it proves that we all tend to project our fantasies onto cultures we don't fully understand. The divergence in perspectives on HN never fails to amuse me.
> It makes me wonder(i'm korean): how would a Westerner react if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain? They’d probably find it strange and out of touch with reality.
Quite the opposite - for me, anyway.
FWIW, as a Westerner, I find the Mondragon Corporation to be fascinating and something I've read a lot about because there's no way we've figured out the ideal sort of setup for a business (or government, or any sort of human organization, given appropriate context) in the year 2026.
We have a lot to learn, and while "different" doesn't always mean "better," I strongly believe being exposed to "different" is necessary for us to devise novel approaches to human organization.
Same thing, being Spanish the Basque Cooperatives movement is fascinating. Do you have any recommended read about it?
I didn't feel like this article necessarily idolized it; the author seemed pretty even-handed about strengths and weaknesses.
The interesting question in all of these kinds of things is "are there ideas we can take to gain the strengths of other systems or patch the weaknesses in ours?". Looking at Japan specifically, I think I speak for most westerners in saying that if we could get a little more stability and less financial-quarter-driven behavior without taking the whole kit of lifetime employment and zombie companies, that would be a good thing. The author points out just how bundled that is, so it's a tough nut to crack.
One model that does give us that is the 'Untouchable visionary CEO' of Jobs and Musk, but I think the popularity of that approach is also limited, partially because of all the not so visionary CEOs trying to be Jobs, and partially because working for those guys is terrible. They inevitably seem to become tyrants.
Most Americans I know are familiar with the unending work culture of Japanese white collar workers (if only a parody version of it), and want no part of it.
I think I've seen the odd HN post about Mondragon that does portray it positively. Though I'm not sure I've seen one in at least several years.
> how would a Westerner react if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain?
HN has had posts romanticizing them, maybe check those
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32622140
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41438060
> it created a massive 'zombie company' problem—a heavily discussed issue in Korea and Japan that the West seems largely blind to
Zombie companies in the west are mentioned as a low/ZIRP phenomena. But the west shouldn't have as big an issue with those because companies, when less diversified, get killed off more often by interest rate hikes.
As someone who finds Japanese corporate culture interesting or even desirable in some ways, it definitely doesn't seem like the most efficient way to run a company. And I'm sure there are plenty of cultural aspects that would not be my cup of tea.
You’re right and that’s intentional. Japanese companies don’t optimize for efficiently but for longevity. Sometimes those things go hand in hand. Sometimes they don’t.
> if they saw me romanticizing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain?
Speaking for myself, I'd find that very interesting! I just stumbled over an article about it a few days ago, and don't think it's weird that different parts of the world would be interested in a regional business phenomenon.
Did you read the entire article? There is a whole section on where western model excels. The article is not about romanticizing Japanese culture, but to tell a story about how and why Japanese and American firms tend to differ. I am sure that it paints in overly broad strokes at times, but I really did not get the impression of idolization, idealism, or even oriental mysticism.
I did read it, but my impression remains the same. While the article does contain critiques of the Japanese system, as an East Asian, I feel it completely misses the actual underlying dynamics.
I know the author isn't trying to paint Japan as a utopia. The reason I call it 'romanticized' is because the author claims Japan's success in precision parts is driven by 'horizontal' and 'collaborative' practices. That just isn't true.
In reality, this system is largely sustained by the ruthless squeezing of subcontractors (for the record, I am Korean, but I actually like Japan), which is a massive social issue there. It’s very difficult for me to understand how anyone could view this structural dynamic as collaborative or horizontal.
If the author had concluded that their success in these niches stems from being an extremely vertical society where defying your superiors is simply not an option, I would have fully agreed. That aligns exactly with what I have experienced firsthand.
Did you read it? I can see how you can come to this conclusion devoid of context. This is actually a topical article - mainly because it is a surprise to many that a toilet company could be one of the biggest winners in the AI pick-and-shovel trade. These names have just recently been hoisted into the spotlight. It's not really a romanization but an explanation of why.
Nothing of this is particular to Japan, it's only the way it manifests in Japan that is adapted to its rich culture. Zombie corporations, corporations with ties to the government, family owned companies, monopolies, cronyism, all of this has been a staple of Western capitalism for centuries.
The core of the article is buried 60% down:
> you have a firm that has lots of lifetime employees who can’t be fired, and whose skills are tailored to what your firm needs rather than to a particular occupational category transferable to any employer
> the system only makes sense if the company is also insulated from outside pressure
> the J-firm [Japan-style company], run by its employees and largely indifferent to the interests of shareholders, exists simply to continue existing
> And that basic impulse toward survival is why Japanese companies are so insistent on diversification. If you’ve made a commitment to keep people employed for life, then you need to create jobs for them if their current jobs stop making sense
> If you’re not very worried about profitability, and have lots of well-trained generalist employees, then it makes perfect sense to reinvest your company’s earnings by expanding into new industries
One other interesting fact about Japanese companies is that their CEOs get paid far far less than Western companies.
Checkout this article that talks about it: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/2010/07/5-lessons-of-ja...
edit: added article.
The writing is a joy and the context is useful. Hardly buried.
I clicked on the article to learn, "why Japanese companies do so many different things," and then got hit with pages of low-bitrate context, such that my eyes started glazing over and it was difficult to find the answer to the question. So I appreciate their compression, or at least pointing to where the answer is found.
Yeah not everyone is a reader these days
The answer is much more deep than those bullet points provide. Hard disagree.
Yes, thank you for compressing it. They start their answer with:
> Here is the answer I want to suggest: Japanese companies excel in lots of very different domains because it’s inherent in how they’re structured.
Which is then backed by some economists saying something similar (generally), but all of which completely ignores Japan’s specific history.
As a better example Of examining Japan, here’s a look at Japan’s monopolies, how they were broken up, and partly how that effected the future of their industry:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5_-Ac68FKG4
> In 2007, workers at a Toyota plant in Kentucky pulled the andon cord 2,000 times per week; workers at a Ford plant in Michigan pulled it just twice a week. You can’t get all the benefits of a single practice without installing the complete bundle.
This example seems to contradict the author's main point.
The Toyota factory in Kentucky got some of the benefits of the Japanese approach without importing every practice. They might have had a more Japanese organisation than Ford, but surely they didn't replace American practices in matters outside their control. They still had to deal with American approaches to labour practices, banking, local government, etc., all of which are called out in the article as necessary for the J-mode to flourish.
> the J-firm, run by its employees and largely indifferent to the interests of shareholders, exists simply to continue existing
I don't know if all companies should be run like Japanese companies, but there's something very heartwarming about this. Some companies exist for the purpose of employment, and that's okay. In fact it's admirable and makes me want to cheer.
I do also think there's a charm to this model but there's a real cost also with Japan's economy stagnating compared to the United States in the last 30 years.
Perhaps, but in terms of the average Japanese persons day to day experience it doesn't seem so bad. They outrank us in almost all QoL measures
They work crazy long hours (the last of which every day don't do much at all for productivity), which is really bad for QoL. Though I hear that the situation is improving.
A hypothesis I had on why some countries have more conglomerates than US is that access to capital and funds are much harder in those countries in comparison to US. When access to capital is comparatively more limited, more innovations falls to the party that has comparatively easier access to capital (conglomerates) and therefore reinforcing their position as conglomerate.
I, from a country with few conglomerates, found the Commoncog explanation for why they exist to be interesting
https://commoncog.com/how-to-become-an-asian-tycoon/
https://commoncog.com/the-asian-conglomerate-series/
My experience in American organizations is that products and services need to not just make money, but make a lot of money. There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money relative to the cash cows of the company. You could say this is in part focus, but it is also based on internal accounting. Small product lines are saddled with total company overhead costs even if they do not apply to said product or service. Not good or bad, but it can lead to strange situations where you have a successful product that everyone complains doesn’t make any money.
> zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money
For obvious reasons, the expected rate of return needs to clear the hurdle of the risk-free interest rate. This puts a pretty high floor on activity that is "worth doing". This is a mechanism by which the phenomenon of ZIRP diversifies economic activity.
> My experience in American organizations is that products and services need to not just make money, but make a lot of money.There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money relative to the cash cows of the company.
Is your experience in the same America where Meta is losing another 4-6 billion $ this year in AR/VR business unit, after losing 19 billion $ last year. Similar with Google's and Apple's AR/VR unit which also consume a lot of money in R&D and not make any money, yet.
So sure, there's no risk appetite for things that make little money, except for all the evidence proving the contrary.
There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money, but in big tech there is limitless appetite for things that lose money but might make a lot of money one day.
If it ends up AI only makes a little profit annually in the longer term the whole thing collapses on itself.
>There is zero appetite for things that make a little bit of money
Because "making little money" is a commodity business overrun with competition from Europe and Asia.
So why would you ever want to compete in the race to the bottom of "little money" when you have the highest labor cost in the world? It makes no business sense.
You go into "all or nothing" moonshots because Europe and Asia can't compete there. Especially when you have the world reserve currency as the infinite money glitch cheat code.
> American firms, for example, tend to prioritize focus above all else: it would be bizarre for an American paper mill to also operate a concert hall and an airport catering business
I don't think Kimberly-Clark ever opetated a concert hall, but they did run an airline (Midwest Express) and K-C Aviation was an airplane servicing firm.
It's not that American companies don't operate in diverse businesses. Maybe they're less likely to, but it happens when the need arises... if there's no reasonable supplier for an important input, then you start one, or you ask an existing supplier if they can start a new line of business that's somewhat related.
The headline example is that Toto, known as a maker of ceramic toliets, is making a lot of money making specialty ceramics used in semiconductor manufacturing. Which yeah, ceramic manufacturer makes ceramics.
The US business market does like to spin-off divisions when they are successful and can be independent.
I almost feel like this topic deserves a further deep dive. This seems like a more profound difference of cultures: Japan, where failure is stigmatized and less of an option, optimizes for survival, and the United States, where failure is common, optimizes for growth(? wealth? fame?).
The pattern might also hold at a broader level. The United States is a relatively young nation that has seen plenty of internal strife (plenty of civil wars including The Civil War) whereas Japan has existed in some form for 2,600 years.
Probably too deep to consider, but the thought hit me that trees and plants (like these J-firms) grow multiple branches as quickly as they can because they are optimizing for survival.
Right, the survival bit made me remember this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ichimonjiya_Wasuke
This paragraph on organizational model is super relevant to understanding how tech companies are responding to LLMs today.
> Aoki’s key insight was that the J-mode had a comparative advantage in environments of moderate volatility: situations where conditions changed frequently enough that rigid central plans would be outdated before they were executed, but not so radically that only top-down strategic intervention could cope. In an environment of stable, predictable demand, the H-firm did fine; in an environment of extreme disruption, where the whole product line had to be rethought, centralized authority was indispensable, and the H-firm also did fine. But in between—where the challenge was to make constant small adjustments in a changing but recognizable paradigm—the J-firm excelled.
See for example https://aakashgupta.medium.com/microsofts-ceo-just-became-a-... or https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-06-12/zucker...
I'm not sure I'd say a company that makes ceramic toilets also making a tool for memory chips... which is also ceramic is really 'different things'. They're clearly a ceramic company. Different tolerances, but similar expertise.
Now the paper company got into the hotel business seems a far better example. No idea how that happens.
> Now the paper company got into the hotel business seems a far better example. No idea how that happens.
That's easy. They have corporate visitors to their corporate offices and the available hotels are insufficient. They decide to just make their own hotel.
There are many corporate campuses with an embedded hotel. Some run by the corporation itself, some with significant management contracting with the corporation, and some independently managed.
Large corporation has a small travel business is very common.
The one key thing that is completely incorrect is there is no horizontal hierarchy. Everyone has a boss, a boss that you must not suggest is wrong. I'm very fond of visiting Japan but having worked there, found it impossibly challenging to get anything done. When things work well it is great and the focused culture produces some great things, but when it fails it leads to catastrophe as no one is able to voice early in the process. Issues are only discovered once they are serious.
They’re an absolute disaster but I do love that the companies are actually investing in expanding into new things. Shareholders don’t want that, they want cold hard cash. Hence all the buybacks and PE firms destroying companies.