Many years ago browsers started alerting users to HTTP (vs HTTPS) connections and HTTPS sites using invalid or untrusted certificates.
How is it possible that in 2026 we're not notified by default when we connect to a cell tower with no certificate so our communications is being broadcast into the air completely unencrypted?
You're asking why a government, that is already known for massive surveillance, wants devices that nearly 100% of the population owns to be completely unencrypted?
There's no indication government is behind this and given that Google is rolling out tools now to protect against it this was probably always doable and just never prioritized.
should'nt you always assume your communications are being broadcast into the air unencrypted unless you're connected with ssl/tls? even if encrypted to the tower the carrier can still intercept all your stuff.
True, but multiple security layers help both through redundancy and because they protect different things.
Cell encryption is not end-to-end, so even with cell signal encryption I'm susceptible to snooping by:
- the phone company
- the government if they serve the cell phone company with a warrant or other legal proceding
- malicious downstream actors
I'll use HTTPS for browsing to mitigate the damage of course, but even so without cell signal encryption, I'm susceptible to all of the above, plus any physically nearby actor can:
- see my text messages and possibly inject fake messages
- hear my phone calls
- see which IP addresses I'm communicating with (though not the contents of that communications if I'm encrypting with HTTPS)
- If app store security is inadequate or has flaws, they could force-feed me a malicious app disgused as an "update".
- I don't control the communications used by individual apps, so they can see any data passed in the clear, and trigger and exploit vulnerabilities in those apps via MITM.
So cell signal encryption helps a lot, though certainly it's not sufficient by itself.
Because the door being open makes it possible for opportunistic thieves and even kids to steal something. If the police knocks on it, it's actually better to open it. Otherwise they will still get in, but you will also not have door after that.
With phone interception, I can't imagine any other actor being sophisticated enough to bother with setting up the stringray thingy. Maybe something very targeted to get somebody very special (having a hot wallet with 20 bitcoins and going around the city with it comes to mind), but I would still expect the simplier methods there too.
Add: Even with the normal HTTP traffic, mitming was way more common and more practically exploitable back in the day, just by setting up a rogue wifi AP and fishing for passowrds. I'm not sure it was ever a thing with stringrays when non-government actors did something with them.
> the attacker can harvest device information and force your phone onto an older, unencrypted protocol.
This is why you should always toggle the setting that disables 2g/3g fallback.
With 4G, for example, your device will refuse to connect fully unless the network can pass the cryptographic challenge that proves it shares the key material included in your SIM card (I know, I know, symmetric keys are not ideal). The best an attacker can hope to do in 4G+ is harvest your subscriber ID (IMSI) or deny you service while you are in range.
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series. They can be found under the “Mobile Network Security” section in the system settings.
What is the point of stringrays anyway? It's a thing that exists, so I believe it does something, but I can't figure out what exactly.
They can go through the area, catch a whole bag of IMSIs and then.... what? What capability does it enable? Knowing when a certain person of interest shows up in a certain locality? Can't they get it from the phone company without a warrant anyways, just by asking nicely? If it's not targeted, what the data is even used for theoretically?
Is something similar available in iOS? Apple's full control over the hardware and software should make it easier than in the Android ecosystem.
> software can only do so much. For these security features to work, your phone's modem has to be able to communicate with the Android OS in a very specific way
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series
Many years ago browsers started alerting users to HTTP (vs HTTPS) connections and HTTPS sites using invalid or untrusted certificates.
How is it possible that in 2026 we're not notified by default when we connect to a cell tower with no certificate so our communications is being broadcast into the air completely unencrypted?
You're asking why a government, that is already known for massive surveillance, wants devices that nearly 100% of the population owns to be completely unencrypted?
There's no indication government is behind this and given that Google is rolling out tools now to protect against it this was probably always doable and just never prioritized.
should'nt you always assume your communications are being broadcast into the air unencrypted unless you're connected with ssl/tls? even if encrypted to the tower the carrier can still intercept all your stuff.
True, but multiple security layers help both through redundancy and because they protect different things.
Cell encryption is not end-to-end, so even with cell signal encryption I'm susceptible to snooping by:
- the phone company
- the government if they serve the cell phone company with a warrant or other legal proceding
- malicious downstream actors
I'll use HTTPS for browsing to mitigate the damage of course, but even so without cell signal encryption, I'm susceptible to all of the above, plus any physically nearby actor can:
- see my text messages and possibly inject fake messages
- hear my phone calls
- see which IP addresses I'm communicating with (though not the contents of that communications if I'm encrypting with HTTPS)
- If app store security is inadequate or has flaws, they could force-feed me a malicious app disgused as an "update".
- I don't control the communications used by individual apps, so they can see any data passed in the clear, and trigger and exploit vulnerabilities in those apps via MITM.
So cell signal encryption helps a lot, though certainly it's not sufficient by itself.
The moment this is rolled out is the moment government will start figuring out how to insert itself into the chain of trust so it will not matter.
Why bother locking the door if it can be kicked down? /s
The harder and obvious it is, the better.
Because the door being open makes it possible for opportunistic thieves and even kids to steal something. If the police knocks on it, it's actually better to open it. Otherwise they will still get in, but you will also not have door after that.
With phone interception, I can't imagine any other actor being sophisticated enough to bother with setting up the stringray thingy. Maybe something very targeted to get somebody very special (having a hot wallet with 20 bitcoins and going around the city with it comes to mind), but I would still expect the simplier methods there too.
Add: Even with the normal HTTP traffic, mitming was way more common and more practically exploitable back in the day, just by setting up a rogue wifi AP and fishing for passowrds. I'm not sure it was ever a thing with stringrays when non-government actors did something with them.
> the attacker can harvest device information and force your phone onto an older, unencrypted protocol.
This is why you should always toggle the setting that disables 2g/3g fallback.
With 4G, for example, your device will refuse to connect fully unless the network can pass the cryptographic challenge that proves it shares the key material included in your SIM card (I know, I know, symmetric keys are not ideal). The best an attacker can hope to do in 4G+ is harvest your subscriber ID (IMSI) or deny you service while you are in range.
As far as I've been able to determine, the main feature this article speaks to is not even on the Pixel 9 - it is only a feature on the Pixel 10.
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series. They can be found under the “Mobile Network Security” section in the system settings.
I believe it's available on Pixel 9 Pro, at least. You might need a recent update, not sure.
Thing is, what're you gonna do about it when you see it?
Edit: whatever the answer is, it needs to work when this pops up frequently, because it will.
Know that you're compromised. Don't say or do anything incriminating. If possible, leave.
I would write a twit about government doing the authoritarian tilt so other people can do something about it. Raising awareness is important.
Interesting question for sure. Given the implied budgets for domestic surveillance, are there any metropolitan areas which do not have fake towers?
What is the point of stringrays anyway? It's a thing that exists, so I believe it does something, but I can't figure out what exactly.
They can go through the area, catch a whole bag of IMSIs and then.... what? What capability does it enable? Knowing when a certain person of interest shows up in a certain locality? Can't they get it from the phone company without a warrant anyways, just by asking nicely? If it's not targeted, what the data is even used for theoretically?
Completely unrelated thought, but it sure is a crying shame that goatse.cx died. :(
I set up a rayhunter, not so worried about myself, but more an early warning if something was to change in the area
Reference in case anyone's interested: https://github.com/EFForg/rayhunter
I believe you need an activate sim in order for it to work correctly, is that correct?
Great! Then you can report them to the police.. oh.
Is something similar available in iOS? Apple's full control over the hardware and software should make it easier than in the Android ecosystem.
> software can only do so much. For these security features to work, your phone's modem has to be able to communicate with the Android OS in a very specific way
> Because of this hardware requirement, the full suite of these network security tools is currently exclusive to the Pixel 10 series
iOS allows disabling 2G connections, but only in lock-down mode.
This would be an amazing feature.
Wouldn't setting your phone to NR/LTE only in the ##4636## service menu prevent this as well (though without a pop up)?
Isn't it the case that disabling 2G on its own is enough to block these issues?
Like the notifications are nice, but they're not a Allow / Deny popup. When you get the popup your data could've been intercepted.