I recall a lot of fingerpointing minutes after the crash by people blaming the presumably foreign maintenance crew.
Even now there is a lot of uncertainty around this crash, maintenance - or lack thereof - or even wrong maintenance could still be a factor. But given the location of the part asking for a 'visual inspection' is a pretty strange move, the part is all but inaccessible when it is in its normal position and even with an endoscope it would be pretty hard to determine whether or not the part had weakened. That's just not going to show up visually until it is way too late unless the part has been especially prepared to announce the presence of hairline cracks.
You'd have to disassemble a good chunk of the wing to gain access to the part based on the pictures I've seen of how it all holds together when assembled.
As a matter of fact, the same issue did occur to US-based-airlines, and the pilots did catch it. That does not however answer the question of whether they just got lucky, or were more skilled, though there are some indications that it may have been skill.
I'm sure that a flaw in the plane can be handled more gracefully by the more skilled set of pilots however that's not the point really. Their point was that the flaw in the plane wasn't a big deal and the loss of life and equipment wasn't Boeing's fault, which wasn't true.
The reason we focus on the OEM more than the pilots is that Boeing getting its act together (or being regulated to do so) is more scalable than every pilot in the world becoming more skilled. Individually blaming pilots isn't effective, regardless of whether you're morally for or against it.
It's not really the same. Pilots need extensive training for how to handle emergency situations and maintenance crew don't. It's not super harsh to say that pilots in different regions are at different levels for those weird situations. It is super harsh to say that maintenance crews in some regions can't do their baseline job.
That's entirely false, the maintenance crew are highly trained people they don't figure out things on the go and when they have to figure out solution to an issue, it's based on what they know about the aircrafts from their training.
Totally agree. Maintenance staff often get ignored. It is worth pointing out how skilled these people are and, in general, how dedicated they are to their task. It is also worth pointing out that often maintenance do get involved in emergencies, especially those that work on the line. I had a guy catch a bleed air leak and signal fire in seconds, saving the engine and potentially a lot more. We like to think of the pilots, but maintainers deserve a lot of credit.
Maintenance crew are highly trained people that in strange situations can pause their work to figure out a fix and ask experts what to do.
Very different from how a pilot has to handle strange situations. Being ready for anything in an airborne plane without a pause button is so much harder, impossibly hard, and not every air authority tries as hard to reach the impossible.
Stand outside an engine test cell for a while and tell me that maintenance crews don't deal with emergencies. I'll bet they do so more often than pilots, we just don't hear about it because there are no passengers at risk. Nobody is going to make a 'Sully' like movie about the maintenance mechanic that spotted an issue with a part under test before it led to one or more catastrophic failures. They're more likely to make a lawyer the lead than the mechanic.
This is not just filling out reports and looking at stuff, they're in no way comparable to your local garage mechanic (and not to dump on them either: they too have to deal with out of the ordinary situations).
The responsibility issues are the same as with the pilots as well, they fuck up people die.
I didn't say there aren't any emergencies, but they're not on the same level.
Also what fraction of engine test cell use is for engine maintenance? Is it a big amount?
And if that kind of test goes wrong the main outcomes are "hit stop" and "oh no it's too late". An emergency like that is not where their expertise is needed, their expertise is in other parts of their job.
Boeing themselves, including their CEOs, kept repeating that bullshit. Even after the FAA finally realised the issue, and refused Boeing's first attempted fix that relied on pilots being able to identify the situation and enact the procedure within 10 seconds (in various tests in a Southwest training center, it was around 30s on average). Then the FAA mandated a full redesign of the MCAS system to actually rely on two sensors and handle disagreements. And Calhoun kept repeating that "this wouldn't have happened with American pilots".
A former air accident investigator who works as an aviation safety consultant said "It's extraordinary that Boeing concluded that a failure of this part would not have safety consequences," and said the report was "disturbing"
Doesn't seem like gray to me. It seems a company who has a history of cutting corners and ignoring or downplaying safety problems did exactly that in this case too which resulted in the deaths of many people. UPS made an error here as well in trusting Boeing when they said it wasn't a safety issue and they should have installed the revised bearing assembly out of an abundance of caution, but I don't know much they would have known back in 2011 about the changes at Boeing that prioritized profit over safety following the merger with McDonnell Douglas
I think every company operating Boeing aircraft should have reviewed their stance on Boeing directives in light of MCAS and the aftermath by now. If they did not that is a failure of sorts as well.
Because my naive conclusion after looking at the part in question is exactly the same "would not result in a safety of flight condition." if the bearing cracked at the point in question it is going nowhere, the bearing is still captive in its housing. hell it looks like it could have been designed as two pieces and it would work the same. the large bolt is what is holding the engine on.
The best I can come up with is that a split bearing causes increased wear on the mounting bracket and nobody noticed for a long time.
That's indeed a very naive conclusion. Once that bearing is gone the stress that it would normally allow to escape on account of rotation would be directly transferred to the metal around it and to the bolts holding the whole thing in place. Guess what broke first?
So if that bearing went that's not quite a smoking gun yet but it would definitely be a step closer to a root cause.
After watching the below video, it's the excess bearing play and thus no-longer-constrained force directions that would seem to be the issue.
With a proper tolerance bearing in place, the force is constrained so that other parts are only stressed in directions they're well suited to handle (because the bearing takes the load).
Once the bearing develops excess tolerance, you've got a bucking engine that (to your point) is directly loading other parts in unexpected ways/directions, eventually causing failure.
The fact that Boeing supposedly modeled this and came up with non-safety critical in the event of bearing breakage... curious how that will turn out.
> The fact that Boeing supposedly modeled this and came up with non-safety critical in the event of bearing breakage... curious how that will turn out.
They'd have to show at least one plane with a bearing gone that still flies as intended. I suggest we break one on purpose, put the full complement of Boeing execs on that plane to prove its safety given the alternative of retracting that statement.
> Once that bearing is gone the stress that it would normally allow to escape on account of rotation would be directly transferred to the metal around it
The bearing would have to sieze up and the bearing axle be locked to the race. There is some limit to rotational torque even with a siezed bearings.
Metaphor: arthritic joints are not smooth, but they will rotate if given enough torque.
From the images, it looks like the bearing had siezed. So presumably rotational vibration was transmitted to airframe and the vibration caused structural failure?
I'm assuming it is not an issue of extreme rotational torque causing the issue (and given it is a bearing the design is for very little torque there!)
The forces on that mount are pretty extreme. Once the bearing seized it was really a matter of time before something gave and given the strength of the casing as well as the strength of the material and mount points it was a toss-up between the bolts and the casing. The previous evidence showed a clear order to the bolts breaking suggesting one bolt was heavier loaded than the remaining ones. The new evidence points to a much more extreme failure.
As for your 'limit to rotational torque': seized bearings do not 'rotate if given enough torque' they will break right out of their casings and whatever those casings are surrounded by. The reason is that unlike your cartilage the bearings are orders of magnitude harder than the materials around them. For a bearing to seize indicates that the material has already deformed, you either catch it before the race goes or it will crack and after that all bets are quite literally off. I'm not aware of any design that would spec a bearing in a situation with such forces that would still happily work with that bearing replaced by a bushing welded to the shaft and the surrounding material even if it is statically in exactly the same position.
What you describe is a worn bearing with an excess of play, not a seized one, which tends to exhibit roughly the same characteristics as a welded joint with dissimilar materials.
Bearings are wear items, bearings that are worn or seized are something that should never ever happen in an aircraft, there is no way that this particular design would continue to function with sufficient margin if that bearing would fail. If not caught before it breaks the next flight is going to be a disaster. Take off in a fully loaded aircraft of this size puts extreme stress on the engine mounts. They are designed with all of their parts in working order, this is not a case of 'oh, we'll fix that the next time this craft is in for maintenance'. All parts of a plane that is certified as airworthy are supposed to be operating as originally specified.
The default assumption is that it all looked good during the last inspection and that the time between the failure occurring and the plane going down was short. If it was not that would be highly unexpected. But again, until the final report is in that's speculative, and if anything the people at the NTSB are scary good at getting to root causes.
FWIW, the MD-11 was designed by McDonnell Douglas, and manufactured by McDonnell Douglas in 1991, before the Boeing merger. A McDonnell Douglas DC-10 failed in a similar way in Chicago in 1979, so it the issue may go way back.
AA Flight 191 in 1979, 273 dead. American Airlines invented their own engine removal procedure using a forklift and damaged a pylon and mounting bracket. The engine ripped off the wing on takeoff.
Interestingly, the reason American Airlines was removing the engines (and pylons) in the first place was to replace that same aft bearing. McDonnell-Douglas had found that the aft bearing could wear out sooner than expected and issued a service bulletin requiring replacement. There is mention of it in the AA191 NTSB report[1] and also at Admiral Cloudberg's article on the accident[2].
Some are forgetting how risk in technology works: No technology is designed or operated without flaws; that's an absurd approach and impossible to implement.
To reduce negative outcomes, we use risk management: assessing the likely lifetime cost of the flaw, and taking cost-effective measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. As a familiar example, redundant mass storage drives are much more cost-effective than high-reliability mass storage drives.
Sure, but the problem is, Boeing is a company that has a proven record of lying about the flaws of their products. There's a huge difference between "shit, nobody thought this part would crack in this way" and "we knew someone would eventually die, but we realized that paying the damages in case this happens is cheaper than preventing the disaster in the first place".
I wonder on what basis Boeing thought that damage to a load-bearing part could be safely ignored? I hope it wasn't "nothing bad has happened for 50+ years, so it's unlikely to happen now"?
They learn pretty quickly to downplay things when their whistleblower collegese either fall down the stairs or kill themselves after telling loved ones that if they die it was not by their own hands.
One thing that worries me about the current political climate is that everything can be politicized. Do we know that behind the scenes Boeing wasn't paying a bribe for better treatment in the report? Or do we know that this report is especially damning because they refused to bribe? I guess we never knew for sure but the level of corruption now is so high I just have no faith that there hasn't been meddling in these investigations. It's the pernicious effect of corruption in a society and I don't think we're ready for it.
Every five years feels too infrequent. These are planes that are 30 years old and have done 100,000 hours of flying. Apparently UPS policy is to keep them around for about 35 years to maximize the ROI. But maybe once they hit a particular age they need to be inspected deeply every few months.
I am not an expert, however. Can metal fatigue be detected with such infrequent inspection?
On things like D check, the aircraft is essentially completely taken apart and inspected at that level typically taking 50,000 man hours and 6 month-1 year of time.
Thanks for this post. I’m blown away by that 50,000 hours figure.
The article mentions the cost and that Boeing underestimates it. When you divide the cost by the number of hours, it seems very reasonable. Parts and materials being included. I’m surprised any job that extensive isn’t even more expensive.
Insane that we can have places like the skunk works create the sr71 and operate on shoe string budgets but the largest passenger plane company in the world can’t accurately assess risk on planes far under the former planes Mach 3 record
Look up the hull loss numbers on the SR-71. More than a third of them were lost in incidents despite never making contact with the enemy.
It was also insanely expensive to operate: $300k/hour in 1990 dollars, and there aren’t reliable numbers on development costs with all of the black budgets.
I don't see that as a valid comparison. SR-71s could operate with a much higher level of risk than commercial passenger planes. IIRC, SR-71s leaked fuel on the ground, and their wings dragged on the ground without special attachments. Pilots needed special pressure suits, etc.
I also expect that they were much less complex than an aircraft that provides a comfortable, pressurized cabin; the high level of safety mentioned above; freight capacity; etc.
Also, despite Boeing's recent problems, I would guess that commerical passenger planes are far more safe than they were decades ago when the SR-71 was developed. Accidents were much more common despite many fewer flights, iirc.
12/32 SR71s were lost in the 33 years they were flying. 11/200 MD-11s have been hull-lost from 1988-2025. Not to mention that passenger/cargo planes will put on a lot more flight hours than the SR71s did in a given year.
The SR-71 is pressurized. Not to sea level pressure, obviously, but it wasn't exactly unpressurized either. The main reason the crew wore pressure suits is for heat retention and oxygen delivery.
the SR-71 leaking fuel on the ground was not a design flaw. it was designed to be operated at speed where things would expand to fill in. if they were filled in on the ground, they'd have no place to expand at speed/temps. the risk assessment was that it was better to leak fuel on the ground rather than blowing up at speed/temp
I recall a lot of fingerpointing minutes after the crash by people blaming the presumably foreign maintenance crew.
Even now there is a lot of uncertainty around this crash, maintenance - or lack thereof - or even wrong maintenance could still be a factor. But given the location of the part asking for a 'visual inspection' is a pretty strange move, the part is all but inaccessible when it is in its normal position and even with an endoscope it would be pretty hard to determine whether or not the part had weakened. That's just not going to show up visually until it is way too late unless the part has been especially prepared to announce the presence of hairline cracks.
You'd have to disassemble a good chunk of the wing to gain access to the part based on the pictures I've seen of how it all holds together when assembled.
> blaming the presumably foreign maintenance crew
The same happened with MCAS, the pro-Boeing argument was that if those were American pilots it would have been fine.
As a matter of fact, the same issue did occur to US-based-airlines, and the pilots did catch it. That does not however answer the question of whether they just got lucky, or were more skilled, though there are some indications that it may have been skill.
I'm sure that a flaw in the plane can be handled more gracefully by the more skilled set of pilots however that's not the point really. Their point was that the flaw in the plane wasn't a big deal and the loss of life and equipment wasn't Boeing's fault, which wasn't true.
The reason we focus on the OEM more than the pilots is that Boeing getting its act together (or being regulated to do so) is more scalable than every pilot in the world becoming more skilled. Individually blaming pilots isn't effective, regardless of whether you're morally for or against it.
Most likely just luck. These days US pilots can’t keep their planes separate from their helicopters so we're not exactly sending our best up there.
It's not really the same. Pilots need extensive training for how to handle emergency situations and maintenance crew don't. It's not super harsh to say that pilots in different regions are at different levels for those weird situations. It is super harsh to say that maintenance crews in some regions can't do their baseline job.
That's entirely false, the maintenance crew are highly trained people they don't figure out things on the go and when they have to figure out solution to an issue, it's based on what they know about the aircrafts from their training.
Totally agree. Maintenance staff often get ignored. It is worth pointing out how skilled these people are and, in general, how dedicated they are to their task. It is also worth pointing out that often maintenance do get involved in emergencies, especially those that work on the line. I had a guy catch a bleed air leak and signal fire in seconds, saving the engine and potentially a lot more. We like to think of the pilots, but maintainers deserve a lot of credit.
Maintenance crew are highly trained people that in strange situations can pause their work to figure out a fix and ask experts what to do.
Very different from how a pilot has to handle strange situations. Being ready for anything in an airborne plane without a pause button is so much harder, impossibly hard, and not every air authority tries as hard to reach the impossible.
Stand outside an engine test cell for a while and tell me that maintenance crews don't deal with emergencies. I'll bet they do so more often than pilots, we just don't hear about it because there are no passengers at risk. Nobody is going to make a 'Sully' like movie about the maintenance mechanic that spotted an issue with a part under test before it led to one or more catastrophic failures. They're more likely to make a lawyer the lead than the mechanic.
This is not just filling out reports and looking at stuff, they're in no way comparable to your local garage mechanic (and not to dump on them either: they too have to deal with out of the ordinary situations).
The responsibility issues are the same as with the pilots as well, they fuck up people die.
I didn't say there aren't any emergencies, but they're not on the same level.
Also what fraction of engine test cell use is for engine maintenance? Is it a big amount?
And if that kind of test goes wrong the main outcomes are "hit stop" and "oh no it's too late". An emergency like that is not where their expertise is needed, their expertise is in other parts of their job.
Boeing themselves, including their CEOs, kept repeating that bullshit. Even after the FAA finally realised the issue, and refused Boeing's first attempted fix that relied on pilots being able to identify the situation and enact the procedure within 10 seconds (in various tests in a Southwest training center, it was around 30s on average). Then the FAA mandated a full redesign of the MCAS system to actually rely on two sensors and handle disagreements. And Calhoun kept repeating that "this wouldn't have happened with American pilots".
The headline is missing an important bit.
Boeing knew of the flaw, and sent a letter to airlines about it. In 2011.
Well yes but Boeing also said it "would not result in a safety of flight condition."
There's a lot of gray going on here.
A former air accident investigator who works as an aviation safety consultant said "It's extraordinary that Boeing concluded that a failure of this part would not have safety consequences," and said the report was "disturbing"
Doesn't seem like gray to me. It seems a company who has a history of cutting corners and ignoring or downplaying safety problems did exactly that in this case too which resulted in the deaths of many people. UPS made an error here as well in trusting Boeing when they said it wasn't a safety issue and they should have installed the revised bearing assembly out of an abundance of caution, but I don't know much they would have known back in 2011 about the changes at Boeing that prioritized profit over safety following the merger with McDonnell Douglas
I think every company operating Boeing aircraft should have reviewed their stance on Boeing directives in light of MCAS and the aftermath by now. If they did not that is a failure of sorts as well.
I am wondering what the exact fail mode here is.
Because my naive conclusion after looking at the part in question is exactly the same "would not result in a safety of flight condition." if the bearing cracked at the point in question it is going nowhere, the bearing is still captive in its housing. hell it looks like it could have been designed as two pieces and it would work the same. the large bolt is what is holding the engine on.
The best I can come up with is that a split bearing causes increased wear on the mounting bracket and nobody noticed for a long time.
Anyhow, here is the ntsb update in question https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA26MA024%20I...
Juan Browne (blancolirio) breaks this down:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5OQzpilyag
Deep link to the most relevant portion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5OQzpilyag&t=5m36s (spherical bearing cut-away diagram, actual bearing again, and failure mode explained)
That's indeed a very naive conclusion. Once that bearing is gone the stress that it would normally allow to escape on account of rotation would be directly transferred to the metal around it and to the bolts holding the whole thing in place. Guess what broke first?
So if that bearing went that's not quite a smoking gun yet but it would definitely be a step closer to a root cause.
After watching the below video, it's the excess bearing play and thus no-longer-constrained force directions that would seem to be the issue.
With a proper tolerance bearing in place, the force is constrained so that other parts are only stressed in directions they're well suited to handle (because the bearing takes the load).
Once the bearing develops excess tolerance, you've got a bucking engine that (to your point) is directly loading other parts in unexpected ways/directions, eventually causing failure.
The fact that Boeing supposedly modeled this and came up with non-safety critical in the event of bearing breakage... curious how that will turn out.
> The fact that Boeing supposedly modeled this and came up with non-safety critical in the event of bearing breakage... curious how that will turn out.
They'd have to show at least one plane with a bearing gone that still flies as intended. I suggest we break one on purpose, put the full complement of Boeing execs on that plane to prove its safety given the alternative of retracting that statement.
> Once that bearing is gone the stress that it would normally allow to escape on account of rotation would be directly transferred to the metal around it
The bearing would have to sieze up and the bearing axle be locked to the race. There is some limit to rotational torque even with a siezed bearings.
Metaphor: arthritic joints are not smooth, but they will rotate if given enough torque.
From the images, it looks like the bearing had siezed. So presumably rotational vibration was transmitted to airframe and the vibration caused structural failure?
I'm assuming it is not an issue of extreme rotational torque causing the issue (and given it is a bearing the design is for very little torque there!)
IANAME (not a mech eng)
The forces on that mount are pretty extreme. Once the bearing seized it was really a matter of time before something gave and given the strength of the casing as well as the strength of the material and mount points it was a toss-up between the bolts and the casing. The previous evidence showed a clear order to the bolts breaking suggesting one bolt was heavier loaded than the remaining ones. The new evidence points to a much more extreme failure.
As for your 'limit to rotational torque': seized bearings do not 'rotate if given enough torque' they will break right out of their casings and whatever those casings are surrounded by. The reason is that unlike your cartilage the bearings are orders of magnitude harder than the materials around them. For a bearing to seize indicates that the material has already deformed, you either catch it before the race goes or it will crack and after that all bets are quite literally off. I'm not aware of any design that would spec a bearing in a situation with such forces that would still happily work with that bearing replaced by a bushing welded to the shaft and the surrounding material even if it is statically in exactly the same position.
What you describe is a worn bearing with an excess of play, not a seized one, which tends to exhibit roughly the same characteristics as a welded joint with dissimilar materials.
Bearings are wear items, bearings that are worn or seized are something that should never ever happen in an aircraft, there is no way that this particular design would continue to function with sufficient margin if that bearing would fail. If not caught before it breaks the next flight is going to be a disaster. Take off in a fully loaded aircraft of this size puts extreme stress on the engine mounts. They are designed with all of their parts in working order, this is not a case of 'oh, we'll fix that the next time this craft is in for maintenance'. All parts of a plane that is certified as airworthy are supposed to be operating as originally specified.
The default assumption is that it all looked good during the last inspection and that the time between the failure occurring and the plane going down was short. If it was not that would be highly unexpected. But again, until the final report is in that's speculative, and if anything the people at the NTSB are scary good at getting to root causes.
The FAA has not determined that this flaw did lead to a safety of flight condition. Investigation is still ongoing.
What's gray? To me it looks like written proof of incompetence.
Apparently they expected it to blow up on the ground, so technically the plane wasn't flying yet ...
Yeah saved boeing losing face and sales by requiring all the planes be grounded and fixed. Just eye it up every 5 years, if you want to.
FWIW, the MD-11 was designed by McDonnell Douglas, and manufactured by McDonnell Douglas in 1991, before the Boeing merger. A McDonnell Douglas DC-10 failed in a similar way in Chicago in 1979, so it the issue may go way back.
AA Flight 191 in 1979, 273 dead. American Airlines invented their own engine removal procedure using a forklift and damaged a pylon and mounting bracket. The engine ripped off the wing on takeoff.
Interestingly, the reason American Airlines was removing the engines (and pylons) in the first place was to replace that same aft bearing. McDonnell-Douglas had found that the aft bearing could wear out sooner than expected and issued a service bulletin requiring replacement. There is mention of it in the AA191 NTSB report[1] and also at Admiral Cloudberg's article on the accident[2].
[1] https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/... [2] https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/rain-of-fire-falling-the...
Some are forgetting how risk in technology works: No technology is designed or operated without flaws; that's an absurd approach and impossible to implement.
To reduce negative outcomes, we use risk management: assessing the likely lifetime cost of the flaw, and taking cost-effective measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. As a familiar example, redundant mass storage drives are much more cost-effective than high-reliability mass storage drives.
They do mention that the DC10 (this plane's predecessor) was decommissioned for similar issues.
Sure, but the problem is, Boeing is a company that has a proven record of lying about the flaws of their products. There's a huge difference between "shit, nobody thought this part would crack in this way" and "we knew someone would eventually die, but we realized that paying the damages in case this happens is cheaper than preventing the disaster in the first place".
I wonder on what basis Boeing thought that damage to a load-bearing part could be safely ignored? I hope it wasn't "nothing bad has happened for 50+ years, so it's unlikely to happen now"?
I’m guessing that manufacturers know of lots of flaws in the parts they make.
Hopefully they don't usually downplay the risks of dangerous known flaws in critical parts like Boeing seems to have done in this case.
They learn pretty quickly to downplay things when their whistleblower collegese either fall down the stairs or kill themselves after telling loved ones that if they die it was not by their own hands.
One thing that worries me about the current political climate is that everything can be politicized. Do we know that behind the scenes Boeing wasn't paying a bribe for better treatment in the report? Or do we know that this report is especially damning because they refused to bribe? I guess we never knew for sure but the level of corruption now is so high I just have no faith that there hasn't been meddling in these investigations. It's the pernicious effect of corruption in a society and I don't think we're ready for it.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA26MA024%20I...
Alternative to paywall: https://archive.ph/8xF1w
Isn't it a mostly Boeing project that is going to go around the moon next month? I'm really afraid for that crew.
Why would you be afraid for them when the Orion capsule worked so flawlessly...oh right.
Are you talking about Starliner? Starliner's 2 flights have been problematic to say the least, but Orion's single (uncrewed) flight went pretty well.
And Lockheed and Airbus are the prime contractors on Orion, not Boeing.
Every five years feels too infrequent. These are planes that are 30 years old and have done 100,000 hours of flying. Apparently UPS policy is to keep them around for about 35 years to maximize the ROI. But maybe once they hit a particular age they need to be inspected deeply every few months.
I am not an expert, however. Can metal fatigue be detected with such infrequent inspection?
Sounds like it is included as part of standardized airplane checks based on age of aircraft + hours flown.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_maintenance_checks#AB...
On things like D check, the aircraft is essentially completely taken apart and inspected at that level typically taking 50,000 man hours and 6 month-1 year of time.
Thanks for this post. I’m blown away by that 50,000 hours figure.
The article mentions the cost and that Boeing underestimates it. When you divide the cost by the number of hours, it seems very reasonable. Parts and materials being included. I’m surprised any job that extensive isn’t even more expensive.
Insane that we can have places like the skunk works create the sr71 and operate on shoe string budgets but the largest passenger plane company in the world can’t accurately assess risk on planes far under the former planes Mach 3 record
Look up the hull loss numbers on the SR-71. More than a third of them were lost in incidents despite never making contact with the enemy.
It was also insanely expensive to operate: $300k/hour in 1990 dollars, and there aren’t reliable numbers on development costs with all of the black budgets.
33 percent attrition and could only fly once a week.
I know satellites and drones have replaced the sr71 but it would be cool if someone would build a plane as capable again.
I don't see that as a valid comparison. SR-71s could operate with a much higher level of risk than commercial passenger planes. IIRC, SR-71s leaked fuel on the ground, and their wings dragged on the ground without special attachments. Pilots needed special pressure suits, etc.
I also expect that they were much less complex than an aircraft that provides a comfortable, pressurized cabin; the high level of safety mentioned above; freight capacity; etc.
Also, despite Boeing's recent problems, I would guess that commerical passenger planes are far more safe than they were decades ago when the SR-71 was developed. Accidents were much more common despite many fewer flights, iirc.
12/32 SR71s were lost in the 33 years they were flying. 11/200 MD-11s have been hull-lost from 1988-2025. Not to mention that passenger/cargo planes will put on a lot more flight hours than the SR71s did in a given year.
The SR-71 is pressurized. Not to sea level pressure, obviously, but it wasn't exactly unpressurized either. The main reason the crew wore pressure suits is for heat retention and oxygen delivery.
the SR-71 leaking fuel on the ground was not a design flaw. it was designed to be operated at speed where things would expand to fill in. if they were filled in on the ground, they'd have no place to expand at speed/temps. the risk assessment was that it was better to leak fuel on the ground rather than blowing up at speed/temp
Right, it was risk management. I doubt that leaking fuel would be acceptable risk management for a commercial passenger plane at a public airport.
Obviously they could have designed something that could expand and contract if they thought it was worth it.
They designed special fuel that wouldn’t catch on fire under normal circumstances.
Also, this was done because airframe skin temps exceeded 400F during flight due to the high speeds.